## Meta-Cognition. An Inverse-Inverse Reinforcement

# Learning Approach for Cognitive Radars

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
**Main Idea.** Detecting utility maximization  $\equiv$  Checking linear feasibility How to make checking linear feasibility difficult?

Cognitive radar  $\rightarrow$  Choose optimal waveform for target tracking Adversarial Target  $\rightarrow$  Malicious maneuvers to 'estimate' radar's utility

How to spoof adversarial attacks on radar's utility function? Ans. Cognition Masking

Intelligently perturbed radar actions successfully hide radar's utility

# Background. Cognitive Radar and Revealed Preference



Cognitive Radar (Utility u)

Cognitive Radar [1-3]: Optimal waveform adaptation. For target maneuvers (probe)  $\{\alpha_k\}_{k=1}^{K}$ , radar chooses waveforms (response)  $\{\beta_k\}_{k=1}^{K}$  that maximize utility u:

 $\beta_k = \operatorname{argmax}_{\beta \in \mathbb{R}^m} u(\beta), \ \alpha'_k \beta \leq 1$ (1)

#### Radar Bayesian tracker: Linear Gaussian dynamics

(i)  $\alpha_k$ : state noise covariance

(ii)  $\beta_k$ : observation noise covariance

(iii)  $\alpha'_k \beta_k < 1$  (1): Bound on radar SNR  $\equiv$  Bound on radar's asymptotic predicted Kalman precision [3]

'Choose best waveform subject to resource constraints'

Utility Estimation via Revealed Preference (RP): **RP Test [4, 5]** : For dataset  $\mathbb{D} = \{\alpha_k, \beta_k\}_{k=1}^{K}$ , linear feasibility test is equivalent to checking for utility maximization (1):

$$\mathsf{RP}(u,\mathbb{D}) \leq 0, \ u = \{u_k,\lambda_k\} \in \mathbb{R}^{2m}_+,$$
 (2)

$$u_{\text{est}}(\beta) = \min_{k} \{ u_k + \lambda_k \alpha'_k (\beta - \beta_k) \}$$
(3)

#### What if $\mathbb{D}$ is noisy?


RP Test (2) generalizes to statistical hypothesis test to detect feasibility [6] (discussed in slide 4).

#### Cognition Masking

How to mitigate adversarial RP test and ensure poor reconstruction of radar's utility function

# Result 1. Deterministic Inverse RP for Masking Cognition

Assumption: "Radar and adversary have accurate probe-response measurements." Adversarial target  $\stackrel{\text{IRL}}{\rightarrow}$  RP Feasibility test (2) (Set-valued estimate of radar's utility) How to rank utility functions in the feasible set? Rank via Margin of RP test - max. perturbation to fail RP test (based on [7])



- Margin: Closeness to edge of feasible set (infeasibility of RP test)
- Center of feasible set: max. margin, edge of feasible set: zero margin
- $\uparrow$  Margin  $\iff \uparrow$  Goodness-of-fit to RP test
- Deterministic Cognition masking: Deliberately perturb radar's response to push radar's utility <u>towards</u> edge of feasible set from RP test

#### Deterministic Inverse IRL for Masking Cognition (Theorem 4)

Suppose radar faces adversarial constraints  $\{\alpha'_k \beta \leq 1\}_{k=1}^{K}$ . The radar's *deterministic* I-IRL algorithm to hide its utility u is:

Step 1. Choose margin  $\epsilon_{\text{thresh}} \in \mathbb{R}_+$ Step 2. Compute naive response  $\beta_k^*$  (1) Step 3. Compute optimal perturbation  $\{\delta_k^*\}$  for I-IRL:  $\{\delta_k^*\} = \underset{\{\delta_k\} \in \mathbb{R}^m}{\operatorname{argmin}} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \|\delta_k\|_2^2, \underbrace{\operatorname{Margin}_{\{\alpha_k, \beta_k^* + \delta_k\}}(u) \leq \epsilon_{\text{thresh}}}_{(\text{Mitigating adversarial RP Test)}}$  (4)

**Step 4**. Transmit engineered sub-optimal responses  $\{\beta_k^* + \delta_k^*\}$ .

#### Summary

**Deterministic I-IRL:** Small margin  $\epsilon_{\text{thresh}}$ 

 $\iff$  Closer to failing RP test (2)


 $\iff$  Larger deviation from radar's optimal strategy

• Margin Constraint in (4) is non-convex (bilinear).

Current research: Formulate convex relaxations of bilinear constraints in (4).

# Numerical Results: Deterministic Inverse IRL

- Simulation-based datasets to illustrate I-IRL for 2 utility functions
- Parameters: Time horizon K = 50, Probe/Response dimension m = 2



### Key Insights:

- Small deviation from optimal strategy masks utility by a large extent.
- Radar's performance degradation  $\uparrow$  with  $\epsilon$ .

## Result 2. Stochastic Inverse RP for Masking Cognition

Assumption: "Adversary has <u>noisy</u> measurements of the radar's response." (Adversary side):  $\hat{\beta}_k = \beta_k + w_k$ ,  $w_k \sim f_W$  ( $f_W$  known to radar)

(5)

Adversarial target  $\xrightarrow{IRL}$  Feasibility *Detector* (see also [3] for details)

 $H_0$ : RP Test (2) has a feasible solution for  $\{\alpha_k, \beta_k\}$ 

 $H_1$ : RP Test (2) has NO feasible solution for  $\{\alpha_k, \beta_k\}$ 

IRL Feasibility Detector :  $\begin{aligned} \phi^*(\widehat{\mathbb{D}}) \leq_{H_0}^{H_1} F_L^{-1}(1-\eta) & (\widehat{\mathbb{D}} = \{\alpha_k, \hat{\beta}_k\}), \quad (6) \\ \phi^*(\widehat{\mathbb{D}}) : \max_{\{\overline{u}>0, \overline{u}(\beta_1)\}} \operatorname{Margin}_{\overline{u}}(\widehat{\mathbb{D}}), \text{ r.v. } L := \max_{j,k} \alpha'_j(w_j - w_k), \\ \eta : \text{ Adversary chosen bound for } \mathbb{P}(H_1|H_0) \end{aligned}$ 

## "Radar is non-cognitive if margin is under a threshold"

- Radar can no more manipulate margin of RP test.
- Can at best manipulate  $\mathbb{P}(H_1|\{\alpha_k,\beta_k\},u)$  (Cond. Type-I error prob.)
- Stochastic Cognition masking: Deliberately perturb radar's response to mitigate IRL detector (<u>increase</u> conditional Type-I error probability).

### Stochastic Inverse IRL for Masking Cognition (Theorem 5)

Adversary's sensor is noisy; everything else the same as deterministic case. Radar's *stochastic* I-IRL algorithm is:

Step 1. Choose sensitivity parameter  $\lambda > 0$ Step 2. Compute naive response  $\beta_k^*$  (1) Step 3. Compute optimal perturbation  $\{\delta_k^*\}$  for I-IRL:  $\{\delta_k^*\} = \underset{\{\delta_k\} \in \mathbb{R}^m}{\operatorname{argmin}} \sum_{k=1}^{K} (u(\beta_k^*) - u(\beta_k^* + \delta_k)) - \lambda \underbrace{\mathbb{P}(H_1 | \{\alpha_k, \beta_k^* + \delta_k\}, u)}_{(\operatorname{Mitigating adversarial IRL detector)}}$  (7) Step 4. Transmit engineered sub-optimal responses  $\{\beta_k^* + \delta_k^*\}$ 


## (7): Ensuring low margin of RP Test with high probability

### Summary

- Stochastic I-IRL: Trade-off between  $\uparrow$  *QoS* and  $\uparrow$  *adversarial obfuscation*.
- Radar can only estimate  $\mathbb{P}(H_1|H_0, u)$  (7) via Monte-Carlo methods.
- Stochastic approximation based algorithms like **SPSA** [8] can be used for implementing optimization problem (7).
- SPSA  $\rightarrow$  Fewer (only 2) computations/update wrt finite diff. methods.

# Numerical Results: Stochastic Inverse IRL

- Simulations for a single utility function  $u(\beta) = \sqrt{\beta_1} + \sqrt{\beta_2}$
- Parameters: Time horizon K = 50, Probe/Response dimension m = 2



## Key Insights:

- Small performance loss sufficiently confuses IRL detector (large cond. Type-I error).
- Both adversarial confusion and radar's performance degradation  $\uparrow$  with  $\lambda.$
- Interestingly, performance degradation  $\downarrow$  with  $\eta$  (error bound).

# **Conclusion and Extensions**

## Summary:

- Radar counter-countermeasure to mitigate an adversarial countermeasure
- Cognition Masking: Deliberately perturb optimal radar waveforms to sufficiently reduce margin of RP test and 'hide' radar's utility.
- Sub-optimality in response trades-off between Privacy and Performance
- Methodology inspired from adversarial obfuscation [9] in deep learning and differential privacy [10]

## Applications of Inverse IRL:

Online Ad Design. Deliberately tweak meta-data to incentivize user clicks Survey Design. Deliberate abnormality in questions to incentivize truthfulness

## Extensions (Current research):

- 1. Finite sample results for spoofing the adversary's IRL detector
- 2. Convex relaxations of the I-IRL objective function
- 3. **Counter**-(counter-)<sup>n</sup>measure: What if adversary knows radar's spoofing strategy? *Game theoretic approach*?

# Thank You!

# Miscellaneous

• How justified is the constrained utility maximization abstraction for radar operation?

## Quite prevalent in literature:

(i) Multi-UAV network [11]: Utility  $\rightarrow$  Fairness and downlink data rate, Constraint  $\rightarrow$  Transmission power, Cramer-Rao bound on localization accuracy (ii) Q-RAM (Resource Allocation) [12]: Utility  $\rightarrow$  QoS for tracking and search, Constraint  $\rightarrow$  Bandwidth, Short-term and Long-term

constraints

(iii) Radar Tracking with ECM [13]: Utility  $\rightarrow$  Neg. of weighted mean of radar energy and dwell time, Constraint  $\rightarrow$  4% Cap on lost tracks due to ECM

• Is conditional Type-I probability the only I-IRL metric for adversarial obfuscation in stochastic I-IRL?

**No fixed formula, does need more work.** Some intuitive alternatives: (a) Use deterministic I-IRL <u>as is</u>. Formulate concentration inequalities for margin of the noisy dataset.

(b) Manipulate the <u>average</u> margin instead of margin. BUT, might be underplaying robustness of IRL detector.

(c) [**Speculative**] Use a neural network to learn IRL method on the fly and disrupt.

Remark: I-IRL hinges delicately on IRL methodology.

Other heuristic ideas to hide utility?

## • What's next after IRL, and inverse IRL? I2-IRL?

Game-theoretic formulation.

Key challenge: Formulate a utility function in terms of both adversary probes and radar response.

Anticipated outcome: Inverse game theory - Detecting play from the Nash equilibrium of a game between adversary and radar.

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